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INTRODUCTION
On May 22, 2013, Lois Lerner, director of the IRS tax-exempt
organizations division, appeared before the House of Representatives
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Oversight
Committee).1 Lerner was called to testify about the IRS’s alleged
targeting of conservative groups seeking 501(c)(4) tax-exempt status.2
Oversight Committee Chairman Representative Darrell Issa3 issued a
subpoena compelling Lerner to come before the Committee, despite
being informed through her counsel that she would assert her Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.4 In a letter dated May
20, 2013 to Chairman Issa, Lerner’s attorney explained that she would
invoke her Fifth Amendment right because the Department of Justice
was simultaneously conducting a criminal investigation on the alleged
targeting of conservative groups by the IRS.5 The letter requested
that Lerner be excused from the hearing and asserted that she “has

1. The IRS: Targeting Americans for Their Political Beliefs: Hearing before H.
Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. 22 (2013) [hereinafter 2013
Oversight Committee Hearing] (statement of Lois Lerner, Director of Exempt
Organizations, Internal Revenue Service), available at http://oversight.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2014/02/2013-05-22-Ser.-No.-113-33-FC-The-IRS-TargetingAmericans-for-Their-Pol-Beliefs.pdf. The allegation that the IRS engaged in
heightened scrutiny of conservative organizations seeking tax-exempt status caused a
national uproar. See, e.g., Chelsea J. Carter et al., ‘Angry’ Obama Announces IRS
Leader’s Ouster After Conservatives Targeted, CNN (May 16, 2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/15/politics/irs-conservative-targeting/.
2. 2013 Oversight Committee Hearing, supra note 1, at 22 (statement of Lois
Lerner, Director of Exempt Organizations, Internal Revenue Service).
3. Republican member of Congress representing California’s 49th congressional
district and Chair of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.
4. Letter from William W. Taylor, III, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, to Hon. Darrell
E. Issa, Chairman, H. Comm. On Oversight & Gov’t Reform (May 20, 2013).
5. Id.
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not committed any crimes or made any misrepresentation but under
the circumstances she has no choice but to take this course.”6
Notwithstanding the request to be excused from the hearing,
Chairman Issa compelled Lerner to appear before the Oversight
Committee “because of, among other reasons, the possibility that she
will waive or choose not to assert the privilege.”7 On the day of the
televised hearing, before invoking her Fifth Amendment right, Lerner
read aloud a brief opening statement that proclaimed in general terms
her innocence of any wrongdoing.8 In response, Chairman Issa and
Oversight Committee Republicans argued that by offering an opening
statement Lerner had waived her Fifth Amendment privilege and
should be subject to questioning by the Oversight Committee.9 An
exchange between Congressman Trey Gowdy10 and Oversight
Committee Ranking Member Elijah Cummings11 summarized the
dispute:
Mr. Gowdy: Mr. Issa, Mr. Cummings just said we should run this
like a courtroom, and I agree with him. She just testified. She just
waived her Fifth Amendment right to privilege. You don’t get to
tell your side of the story and then not be subjected to cross
examination. That’s not the way it works. She waived her right of
Fifth Amendment privilege by issuing an opening statement. She
ought to stay in here and answer our questions . . . .
Mr. Cummings: Mr. Chairman, . . . first of all, with all respect for my
good friend Mr. Gowdy, I said I would like to see it run like a

6. Id.
7. Letter from Hon. Darrell Issa, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t
Reform, to William W. Taylor, III, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP (May 21, 2013).
8. 2013 Oversight Committee Hearing, supra note 1, at 22 (statement of Lois
Lerner, Director of Exempt Organizations, Internal Revenue Service) (“I have not
done anything wrong. I have not broken any laws. I have not violated any IRS rules
or regulations, and I have not provided false information to this or any other
congressional committee. And while I would very much like to answer the
committee’s questions today, I’ve been advised by my counsel to assert my
constitutional right not to testify or answer questions related to the subject matter of
this hearing. After very careful consideration, I have decided to follow my counsel’s
advice and not testify or answer any of the questions today. Because I’m asserting
my right not to testify, I know that some people will assume that I’ve done something
wrong. I have not.”).
9. Id. at 23–24.
10. Republican member of Congress representing South Carolina’s fourth
congressional district.
11. Democratic member of Congress representing Maryland’s seventh
congressional district and Ranking Member of the House Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform.
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federal court. Unfortunately, this is not a federal court, and she
does have a right, and I think . . . we have to adhere to that.12

Still, Lerner refused to answer any questions, and eventually
Chairman Issa recessed the hearing and allowed Lerner to leave.13
On June 28, 2013, just over a month after the initial hearing, the
Oversight Committee voted that “Lerner’s self-selected, and entirely
voluntary, opening statement constituted a waiver of her Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because a witness
may not testify voluntarily about a subject and then invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination when questioned about the
details.”14
Additionally, in response to Lerner’s testimony,
Congressman Mo Brooks15 introduced legislation on June 20, 2013 to
“terminate any Federal employee who refuses to answer questions or
gives false testimony in a congressional hearing.”16
Despite voting that Lerner had waived her right to remain silent
and passing a resolution and introducing legislation that would
automatically terminate any federal employee who declined to
answer questions at a congressional hearing, the Oversight
Committee was not yet done with Lerner. On March 5, 2014,
Chairman Issa compelled Lerner to reappear before the Oversight
Committee17 despite again being informed by counsel that Lerner
would not answer questions pursuant to her Fifth Amendment right.18
At the hearing, Lerner once more declined to answer questions from
the Committee.19 This time, in response to Lerner’s decision to

12. 2013 Oversight Committee Hearing, supra note 1, at 23.
13. Id. at 24. The damage to Lerner was already done. She subsequently retired
on September 13, 2013. See John D. McKinnon, Lois Lerner, at Center of IRS
Investigation, Retires, Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702304713704579093461064758006.
14. Resolution of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 113th
Cong. (2013), available at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/
Resolution-of-the-Committee-on-Oversight-and-Government-Reform-6-28-131.pdf.
15. Republican member of Congress representing Alabama’s fifth congressional
district.
16. H.R. 2458, 113th Cong. (2013).
17. The IRS: Targeting Americans for Their Political Beliefs before H. Comm. on
Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. (2014) [hereinafter 2014 Oversight
Committee Hearing].
18. Letter from William W. Taylor, III, Zuckerman Spaeder LLP, to Hon. Darrell
E. Issa, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (Feb. 26, 2014) (on file
with the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform).
19. 2014 Oversight Committee Hearing, supra note 17.
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invoke her constitutional right, the Oversight Committee voted to
hold her in criminal contempt of Congress.20
Roughly one month later, the House of Representatives held
Lerner in contempt by a vote of 231 to 187.21 The Resolution holding
Lerner in contempt, House Resolution 574, directed the Speaker of
the House of Representatives to certify the Oversight Committee’s
report regarding Lerner’s refusal to testify before the Committee to
the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia.22 It also directed the
U.S. Attorney to “take all appropriate action to enforce the
subpoena.”23 If Lerner is found guilty under the current criminal
contempt statute, she faces a fine of up to $100,000 and imprisonment
for up to one year.24
Tension between the individual right against self-incrimination and
Congress’s investigative role is not new. When political scandals
arise, legislators are quick to conduct public and high-profile
investigations and to subpoena the actors involved to testify and
explain their actions.25 For example, the Fifth Amendment played a
prominent role during the McCarthy era when Congress investigated

20. Josh Hicks, House Committee Votes to Hold Ex-IRS Official Lois Lerner in
Contempt, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
federal-eye/wp/2014/04/10/house-committee-votes-to-hold-ex-irs-official-lois-lernerin-contempt-of-congress/.
21. H.R. Res. 574, 113th Cong. (2014). The vote split along partisan lines with
only six Democrats voting in favor of the resolution and no Republicans voting
against it. See Ed O’Keefe, House Votes to Hold Lois Lerner in Contempt of
Congress, WASH. POST, May 7, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/postpolitics/wp/2014/05/07/house-votes-to-hold-lois-lerner-in-contempt-of-congress/.
22. H.R. Res. 574.
23. Id.
24. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (2012) (“Every person who having been summoned as a witness
by the authority of either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers
upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee
established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any
committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having
appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than
$1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one
month nor more than twelve months.”).
25. This phenomenon is not limited to Congress. For example, the tension
presented itself following revelations that New Jersey Governor Chris Christie’s staff
members and political appointees had intentionally closed multiple lanes at a toll
plaza entrance on the George Washington Bridge as political retribution against Fort
Lee Mayor Mark Sokolic. In the midst of numerous state and federal hearings and
investigations, several people involved have asserted their Fifth Amendment rights.
See, e.g., David W. Chen & William K. Rashbaum, Former Aide to Christie Invokes
Fifth Amendment Right, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/
04/nyregion/former-aide-to-christie-invokes-fifth-amendment.html.
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alleged communist infiltration in American society26 and during the
Iran-Contra affair investigation that shook the Reagan presidency.27
In both instances, Congress engaged in high-profile, public
investigations and was confronted with witnesses who asserted their
Fifth Amendment rights and declined to answer questions. Yet,
despite the persistent conflict between individual rights and
Congress’s investigative powers, there is no definitive standard to
guide or control situations where members of Congress wish to
compel a witness to appear before a congressional committee when
counsel informs them that the witness will invoke his or her Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent.
Given the recurring ethical and constitutional issues involved, the
District of Columbia Bar (D.C. Bar) has offered one approach to
address this divisive subject in the form of an advisory ethics
opinion.28 D.C. Legal Ethics Opinion 358 (Opinion 358) provides that
“a violation [of the rules of ethics] occurs only where the summons [of
a witness who intends to assert his or her Fifth Amendment right]
serves no substantial purpose ‘other than to embarrass, delay, or
burden’ the witness.”29 In other words, according to the D.C. Bar’s
advisory analysis, a lawyer may call a witness to appear even if he or
she knows the witness will refuse to answer questions, so long as the
lawyer’s intent is not solely to pillory the witness.30
In light of the ever-growing partisanship in Washington31 and the
increasing politicization of congressional investigations,32 the tension
26. See, e.g., Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955); Quinn v. United
States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
27. See, e.g., Iran-Contra Hearings: Sharp Words on Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, July
14,
1987,
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/14/world/iran-contra-hearings-sharpwords-on-immunity.html.
28. See generally Peter A. Joy, Making Ethics Opinions Meaningful: Toward
More Effective Regulation of Lawyers’ Conduct, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 313, 314
(2002) (explaining that “in many jurisdictions the ethics opinion will be purely
advisory”).
29. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Op. 358 (2011) (quoting D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Op. 31
(1977)).
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Drew Desilver, Partisan Polarization, in Congress and Among
Public, Is Greater Than Ever, PEW RES. CENTER, July 17, 2013, http://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/07/17/partisan-polarization-in-congress-andamong-public-is-greater-than-ever/. This increased polarization is also apparent from
other congressional investigations into hot button issues such as the attack on the
American embassy in Benghazi and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
operation “Fast and Furious” fiasco. See Keith Boykin, Grandstanding and Hype,
N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/05/08/arecongressional-hearings-serious-investigations-or-just-party-politics/grandstandingand-hype; Ernesto Londoño & Karen DeYoung, At Benghazi Hearing, State Dept.
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between individual Fifth Amendment rights and Congress’s
investigative mandate is likely to recur with prominence and
increased acrimony in the future. Without a clear standard to
determine when to compel individuals to appear in person and assert
their constitutional rights, lawmakers will be left making ad hoc
decisions. This result raises significant ethical, constitutional, and
legislative policy concerns.
This Note provides a detailed analysis of whether members of
Congress should be able to compel a witness to appear before a
committee when the individual has stated that he or she will invoke
the right against self-incrimination.33 Part I of this Note discusses the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Congress’s
broad investigative authority, and the tension that arises between the
two. Part II analyzes three possible approaches to address situations
when individuals inform congressional committees beforehand that
they will invoke their right against self-incrimination: (1) excuse the
witness from appearing before the committee, (2) compel the witness
to appear before the committee and invoke the Fifth Amendment
privilege live and in-person, and (3) compel the witness to appear
before the committee unless the sole purpose of calling the witness is
to shame or pillory him or her. Finally, Part III explains why
members of Congress should excuse a witness who has formally
expressed through counsel that he or she will assert a valid privilege
against self-incrimination. Such an approach would establish a
proper, ethical balance between Congress’s investigative power and
the individual constitutional right against self-incrimination.

Officials Challenge Administration Review of Attacks, WASH. POST, May 8, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/house-committee-holdshearing-on-benghazi-attacks/2013/05/08/639da672-b7ea-11e2-b94c-b684dda07add_
story.html.
32. See Boykin, supra note 31.
33. According to the Congressional Research Service, 156 members of the House
of Representatives and fifty-five Senators in the 113th Congress are attorneys.
JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42964, MEMBERSHIP OF THE 113TH
CONGRESS: A PROFILE 3 (2014), available at http://www.senate.gov/CRSReports/crspublish.cfm?pid=%260BL%2BR%5CC%3F%0A. Nearly forty percent of Congress
is comprised of lawyers. See id. Further, the rules, regulations, and guidelines that
regulate attorneys should inform the behavior of all members, as Congress is the lawmaking branch of the government.
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I. THE TENSION BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL FIFTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND CONGRESS’S
INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY
Congress has conducted investigations since America’s inception,
even though the Constitution contains no explicit language granting
Congress such power. The first congressional investigation began in
1792, just three years after the Constitution’s ratification, when the
House of Representatives established a committee to investigate
General Arthur St. Clair’s defeat by American Indians at the Battle
of the Wabash.34 A seven-member special committee was formed to
investigate the cause of the army’s defeat by the combined forces of
the Miami, Shawnee, and Delaware Indian Tribes.35 During the
debate on the Floor of the House of Representatives, it is clear that
no member of Congress questioned the House’s inherent authority to
investigate.36 Precedent to conduct such an inquiry was also readily
available in both the British Parliament and the American colonies’
legislatures.37 For over a century, Congress continued to investigate
issues as it saw fit, with minimal involvement or supervision by the
judiciary.38
In the 1920s, the Supreme Court formally recognized Congress’s
power to engage in oversight and conduct investigations necessary to
carry out its legislative functions.39 Subsequent cases reaffirmed the
expansive breadth of Congress’s investigative power.40 The Court in
Watkins v. United States observed, more specifically, that Congress’s
investigative power “comprehends probes into departments of the
34. See Michael Edmund O’Neill, The Fifth Amendment in Congress: Revisiting
the Privilege Against Compelled Self-Incrimination, 90 GEO. L.J. 2445, 2458–60
(2002). By a vote of forty-four to ten, Congress adopted a resolution which
appointed a committee to investigate the army’s defeat and empowered it “to call for
such persons, papers, and records, as may be necessary to assist their inquiries.” Id. at
2459.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See M. Nelson McGeary, Congressional Investigations: Historical
Development, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 425 (1951).
38. Id.
39. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 291 (1929) (noting “the power of
inquiry is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function”); McGrain
v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927) (recognizing Congress’s authority to conduct
investigations to effectively legislate).
40. Eastland v. United States Serviceman’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504–05 (1975);
Committee on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 84 (D.D.C. 2008) (“In short,
there can be no question that Congress has a right—derived from its Article I
legislative function—to issue and enforce subpoenas, and a corresponding right to the
information that is the subject of such subpoenas.”).
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Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste,”41
and referred further to “the power of the Congress to inquire into and
to publicize corruption, maladministration or inefficiency in agencies
of government.”42 The Court has consistently recognized that
Congress has broad authority to investigate when it is acting to
further legitimate legislative ends or is overseeing the federal
government.
While Congress has expansive oversight authority, its power is not
unlimited.43 It must be exercised pursuant to and in aid of Congress’s
legislative function, and not “to expose the private affairs of
individuals without justification in terms of the functions of
Congress . . . [and] must be related to, and in furtherance of, a
legitimate task of the Congress.”44 Courts have held that a committee
lacks legislative purpose if it appears to be performing a legislative
trial instead of conducting an investigation to further its legislative
purpose.45 For example, in United States v. Icardi, the District Court
for the District of Columbia dismissed the perjury charge against a
defendant because the congressional subcommittee that questioned
the defendant was not acting as a “competent tribunal”46 at the time.
The court explained that to act as a competent tribunal, a committee
must be “pursuing a bona fide legislative purpose when it secures the
testimony of any witness.”47 Because the court in Icardi determined
that the subcommittee was not acting pursuant to a legitimate
legislative purpose, but was instead conducting a “legislative trial,” it
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges.48 Although
cases such as Icardi highlight the limit to Congress’s ability to
investigate, when Congress is acting as a competent tribunal, it enjoys
broad authority to obtain information it deems relevant to its
inquiry.49

41. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
42. Id. at 200 n.33.
43. Id. at 187.
44. Id.
45. See United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383, 388 (D.D.C. 1956); see also
United States v. Cross, 170 F. Supp. 303, 306 (D.D.C. 1959) (“[W]hen a duly
constituted investigative committee questions a witness solely for a purpose other
than to elicit facts in aid of legislation, that committee steps outside its authority and
no longer acts as a competent tribunal.”).
46. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. at 388.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 388–89.
49. See, e.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927) (upholding
Congress’s power to issue subpoenas).
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A key component of Congress’s investigative power is its authority
to subpoena witnesses.50
The Supreme Court explained that
Congress’s subpoena power is necessary because, “mere requests for
such information often are unavailing, and . . . information which is
volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed.”51 Similar to its
general investigative power, Congress may issue subpoenas so long as
they further a valid legislative purpose and are not mere “fishing
expeditions.”52 The Court in Watkins noted that subpoenaed
information that is “unrelated to any legislative purpose” must yield
to the individual right to privacy.53 While the subpoena power is a
critical tool for Congress’s investigative efforts, it is not the only way
Congress can obtain information from recalcitrant sources.54
Congress also has the power to hold individuals who obstruct the
legislative process in contempt.55 The contempt power may be
wielded in three distinct ways.56 First, Congress has the ability to
employ its constitutional authority to detain and imprison an
individual until he or she complies with congressional demands.57
Second, pursuant to the criminal contempt statute,58 Congress can
certify a contempt citation to the executive branch for the criminal
prosecution of the contemnor.59 Since 1935, Congress has primarily
utilized criminal contempt when dealing with noncompliant

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 198 (1957); Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924) (noting that “[i]t is contrary to the first
principles of justice to allow a search through all the respondents’ records, relevant or
irrelevant, in the hope that something will turn up”).
53. Watkins, 354 U.S. at 198.
54. Congress can find individuals in contempt for obstructing the legislative
process. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194 (2012).
55. 2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194; see generally TODD GARVEY & ALISSA M. DOLAN,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34097, CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER AND THE
ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS: LAW, HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND
PROCEDURE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 1 (2014), available at
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34097.pdf.
56. GARVEY & DOLAN, supra note 55, at 1.
57. Id. In 1795, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution holding
Robert Randall, an American businessman, in contempt for attempting to bribe
members of Congress. See O’Neill, supra note 34, at 2462. Upon adoption of the
resolution, Randall was arrested and placed in the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms
until he petitioned the House for forgiveness. See id. The Court explicitly affirmed
Congress’s inherent contempt power in Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 233 (1821).
58. 2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194.
59. GARVEY & DOLAN, supra note 55, at 1.
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witnesses.60 Lastly, Congress can seek civil judgment from a federal
court declaring that the contemnor must comply with the subpoena.61
Congress passed its first statute enabling criminal contempt by the
legislative body in 1857, and the statute still exists in the modern
day.62 The current criminal contempt statute provides that a witness
is guilty of a misdemeanor and may be imprisoned for up to one year
and fined up to $100,000 if he or she fails to testify or produce
documents as ordered pursuant to a subpoena.63 The Supreme Court
found that Congress’s contempt power is a natural outgrowth of its
investigative power because without such an enforcement mechanism
Congress would be “exposed to every indignity and interruption that
rudeness, caprice, or even conspiracy, may meditate against it.”64
In the 1950s, Congress’s investigative power came into direct
conflict for the first time with the rights of individuals to assert their
privilege against self-incrimination when subpoenaed to appear
before, or provide documents to, a congressional committee.65
During this period, anticommunist paranoia prompted Congress to
hold numerous congressional hearings on the alleged communist
infiltration of American society and government.66 These hearings
were primarily convened by the House Committee on Un-American
Activities and the Senator Joseph McCarthy-run Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations.67 To avoid becoming embroiled in

60. MORTON ROSENBERG, THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, WHEN CONGRESS COMES
CALLING: A PRIMER ON THE PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, AND PRAGMATICS OF
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY 16 (2009), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/175.pdf. (noting “this burden may be extremely difficult to
meet”).
61. See GARVEY & DOLAN, supra note 55, at 1, 23–34. The Senate has existing
statutory authority to enforce subpoenas through civil contempt. See 2 U.S.C.
§§ 288b(b), 288d (2012). While the House of Representatives lacks explicit statutory
authority to pursue civil contempt, the House appears able to authorize a committee
to seek civil enforcement of a subpoena in federal court. See Comm. on the Judiciary
v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 65 (D.D.C. 2008). In Miers, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia found that the House Committee on the Judiciary could
properly seek enforcement of its subpoenas in federal court because the House had
authorized the Judiciary Committee to seek civil enforcement action to compel
compliance with its subpoenas in that instance. Id. at 70–71.
62. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, §3, 11 Stat. 156 (1857). The constitutionality of
the statute was upheld in In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 171 (1897).
63. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (2012).
64. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 228 (1821).
65. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself”).
66. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Age of McCarthy: A
Cautionary Tale, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1387 (2005).
67. Id.
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these investigations and having their reputations ruined by being
publicly accused of supporting communism, many witnesses began to
invoke their constitutional right against self-incrimination.68 Notably,
the critical question that arose as individuals began to assert their
constitutional rights in these congressional hearings was not whether
the privilege applied in the congressional context, but whether the
individuals had properly invoked their rights.69
On its face, the Fifth Amendment speaks to “criminal trials.”
Nonetheless, the privilege has traditionally been understood as
applying to Congress.70 In the 1950’s, the Supreme Court reinforced
this understanding in Quinn v. United States71 and Emspak v. United
States.72 In Quinn and Emspak the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether an individual testifying before a congressional
committee had actually asserted his or her privilege against selfincrimination.73 Implicit in the Court’s analysis in these cases was the
understanding that the right against self-incrimination can apply in
the congressional context so long as the individual properly asserts
the privilege.74
In Quinn, the defendant, Quinn, was convicted of contempt for
refusing to answer when asked whether he was a member of the
communist party, citing vaguely to his rights under the First and Fifth
Amendment.75 Quinn was sentenced to a term of six months in jail
and a $500 fine.76 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed Quinn’s conviction, and the Supreme Court affirmed
the appellate court’s holding.77 Although Quinn’s objections were
imprecise and not specific to his Fifth Amendment right against self-

68. Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Advances and Departures in the Criminal Law of the
States: A Selective Critique, 69 ALB. L. REV. 489 (2006).
69. See O’Neill, supra note 34, at 2514–15.
70. James Hamilton et al., Congressional Investigations: Politics and Process, 44
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1115, 1138 n.123 (2007) (explaining that “[d]uring the nineteenth
century, the privilege was invoked on several occasions in response to congressional
inquiries, including by Presidents Jackson and Grant”).
71. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955).
72. Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 194 (1955).
73. Quinn, 349 U.S. at 162; Emspak, 349 U.S. at 194.
74. Quinn, 349 U.S. at 162 (“In the instant case petitioner was convicted for
refusing to answer the committee’s question as to his alleged membership in the
Communist Party. Clearly an answer to the question might have tended to
incriminate him. As a consequence, petitioner was entitled to claim the privilege.
The principal issue here is whether or not he did.”); Emspak, 349 U.S. at 194.
75. Quinn, 349 U.S. at 157–58.
76. Id. at 159.
77. Id. at 160, 170.
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incrimination, the Court found that his words were adequate to have
invoked the privilege.78 By holding that there is “no ritualistic
formula . . . necessary in order to invoke the privilege,” the Court
emphasized the breadth and importance of Fifth Amendment rights.79
According to the Court, all that is required to claim such a cherished
and fundamental protection is a statement uttered in a way that a
committee may “reasonably be expected to understand as an attempt
to invoke the privilege.”80
In Emspak v. United States, the companion case to Quinn, the
Supreme Court addressed the same issue of whether the defendant
had adequately asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege before
Congress.81 In Emspak, the defendant refused to answer certain
questions and stated, “I think it is my duty to endeavor to protect the
rights guaranteed under the Constitution, primarily the first
amendment, supplemented by the fifth.”82 As in Quinn, the Court in
Emspak restated that an individual does not need to assert a specific
phrase or combination of words to invoke the right against selfincrimination.83 Thus, the Court in Emspak, as well as Quinn, clearly
recognized that individuals can invoke their Fifth Amendment right
before congressional investigations.
Over time, after the Supreme Court recognized that the right
against self-incrimination applies to congressional investigations and
witnesses continued to invoke their rights, society and Congress came
to view the Fifth Amendment disfavorably.84 From a societal
perspective, the Fifth Amendment privilege was seen as the refuge of
scoundrels and an escape hatch for the guilty.85 During the McCarthy
era, “the term ‘Fifth Amendment Communist’ came into fashion,
designating witnesses who, faced with answering potentially

78. Id. at 164.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 163. Contrast this liberal interpretation of what constitutes an effective
invocation of a witness’s privilege against self-incrimination with a defendant’s
attempt to invoke his right to silence in the context of a law enforcement
interrogation pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Berghuis v.
Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010), the Court held that to effectively invoke his right to
silence, the defendant must do so unambiguously and unequivocally. Id. at 381.
81. Quinn, 349 U.S. at 194.
82. Id. at 202.
83. Id. at 194.
84. See Friedelbaum, supra note 68, at 508; O’Neill, supra note 34, at 2515.
85. See Friedelbaum, supra note 68, at 508 (“The constitutional safeguard, long
recognized among the bulwarks of human liberty, came to be regarded in the popular
idiom as a spurious defense by those who sought to conceal spurious acts.”).
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incriminating congressional questions, refused to answer.”86 Even
then-President Dwight Eisenhower went so far as to remark, “I must
say I probably share the common reaction if a man has to go to the
Fifth Amendment, there must be something he doesn’t want to tell.”87
From a congressional standpoint, the Fifth Amendment privilege
became a significant impediment to obtaining witness testimony. This
obstacle led to the passage of the Immunity Act of 1954, which gave
Congress the power to compel incriminating testimony in exchange
for immunizing the witness from criminal prosecution.88
Despite the new version of immunity, the conflict between the
Fifth Amendment and Congress’s investigatory power was far from
over. The type of immunity authorized by the Immunity Act of 1954
was similar to early statutes that conferred “transactional” immunity
upon the witness.89 Transactional immunity insulated the witness
from criminal prosecution based on “any fact or act touching which
he shall be required to testify before either House of Congress” while
under a grant of immunity.90 Because of its sweeping scope,
transactional immunity came to be known as the “immunity bath,”
and was anathema to federal prosecutors who were conducting
criminal probes at the same time Congress was investigating.91
Further, transactional immunity created an incentive for individuals
to confess to unrelated crimes while they were granted immunity to
avoid prosecution for their other offenses.92 For example, in 1862,
Congressman James F. Wilson93 noted, “every day persons are
offering to testify before the investigating committees of the House in
order to bring themselves within the pardoning power of the Act of

86. O’Neill, supra note 34, at 2515.
87. Daniel H. Pollitt, The Fifth Amendment Plea Before Congressional

Committees Investigating Subversion: Motives and Justifiable Presumptions—A
Survey of 120 Witnesses, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1117 (1958).
88. The Immunity Act of 1954, ch. 769, 68 Stat. 745; see Comment, The Federal
Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional
Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568, 1576–77 (1963). The Immunity Act of 1954 was upheld
by the Supreme Court in Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 436 (1956).
89. Jerome A. Murphy, The Aftermath of the Iran-Contra Trials: The Uncertain
Status of Derivative Use Immunity, 51 MD. L. REV. 1011, 1015 (1992). Congress
passed the first federal immunity statute in 1857. See Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, 11
Stat. 155, 156. This statute granted transactional immunity to any witnesses testifying
before Congress. Id. The statute provided extensive protections for any witness
testifying before Congress under a grant of immunity.
90. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, 11 Stat. 155, 156.
91. Murphy, supra note 89, at 1015.
92. Id. at 1015 n.34.
93. Republican member of Congress representing Iowa’s first congressional
district from 1861 through 1869.
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1857 [the transactional immunity statute].”94 These concerns with the
transaction immunity’s broad reach eventually led Congress to revise
its approach.
In 1970 Congress passed the Organized Crime Control Act, which
established a more limited form of immunity known as “use” or
“derivative use” immunity.95 Use immunity provides that the
testimony a witness gives and the information derived from it cannot
be used against the person in a subsequent criminal proceeding.96
However, an individual may be convicted of the crime based on
information obtained independently by the prosecution.97 This type
of immunity was upheld by the Supreme Court two years after its
passage in Kastigar v. United States.98 In Kastigar, the government
obtained a court order “directing petitioners to answer questions and
produce evidence before the grand jury under a grant of immunity
conferred pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003.”99 The witnesses in
question appeared before the grand jury but refused to answer
questions, asserting their privilege against self-incrimination.100 The
witnesses were then brought before the District Court for the Central
District of California and found in contempt.101 The case eventually
made its way to the Supreme Court, and the Court affirmed the
decision to hold the witnesses in contempt.102 The Supreme Court
explained that the “immunity from use and derivative use [under 18
U.S.C. § 6002] is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against
self-incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel testimony
over a claim of the privilege.”103 In other words, because the
prosecution cannot use information revealed when an immunized
witness testifies—unless the information was independently
obtained—use immunity does not violate an individual’s right against
compelled self-incrimination.104
94. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 364, 364 (1862).
95. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 926
(codified in sections of 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001–05 (1988)).
96. See MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95-464, INVESTIGATIVE
OVERSIGHT: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE OF
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 8 (1995).
97. Id.
98. 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972) (finding use and derivative use immunity as adequate
protection of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination).
99. Id. at 442.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 462.
103. Id. at 453.
104. Id.
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This legislative approach has still not resolved the conundrum of
whether members of Congress should compel an individual to appear
before a committee to invoke the right against self-incrimination. If a
witness is prosecuted after giving immunized testimony, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that the charges were not
based on the witness’s testimony or evidence derived therefrom.105
Establishing that the prosecution grew out of independent evidence
has proven in practice to be a heavy burden for the prosecution to
overcome.106
The Iran-Contra scandal during the Reagan presidency
demonstrates the difficulty of prosecuting an individual after he or
she has given use-immunized testimony.107 This inquiry involved a
congressional investigation into whether the Reagan Administration
sold weapons to Iran and used the proceeds to fund anti-communist
rebels in Nicaragua.108 High-ranking officials, including Lieutenant
Colonel Oliver North, were given use immunity, and testified before
Congress in a publicly televised hearing.109 Simultaneously, the
Special Division of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit Court appointed an independent counsel
to investigate any criminal wrongdoing in the affair.110
Subsequent to providing his testimony, Lieutenant North was
convicted on conspiracy and obstruction charges.111 The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed Lieutenant North’s
conviction and remanded the case on the basis that the conviction was
obtained in reliance on immunized testimony.112 The court of appeals
reached this conclusion even though the prosecution had taken
“extraordinary” steps to avoid relying on Lieutenant North’s
statements, including submitting sealed evidence packets to the

105. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460 (explaining that granting immunity “imposes on the
prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is
derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony”)
106. Id. at 461–62 (explaining that “[o]ne raising a claim under this [use immunity]
statute need only show that he testified under a grant of immunity in order to shift to
the government the heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to
use was derived from legitimate independent sources”); see also ROSENBERG, supra
note 60, at 13 (noting “this burden may be extremely difficult to meet”).
107. See Murphy, supra, note 89, at 1035–37.
108. Id. at 1035.
109. Id. at 1036.
110. Id. at 1035.
111. Id. at 1037.
112. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 852 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam),
modified, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
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district court.113 Upon remand, the prosecution dismissed the case
because it could not meet its burden of showing that all of the
evidence it proposed to use was derived from legitimate independent
sources.114 The failed prosecution of Lieutenant North epitomizes the
heavy burden the prosecution must overcome to successfully
prosecute a high-profile case where the witness has been granted use
immunity.
In light of this extensive history, the question remains: what can a
member of Congress do when he or she wishes to question a witness
but the witness intends to invoke the privilege against selfincrimination, and granting the witness immunity may serve as a de
facto bar to any potential criminal prosecution? The popular current
approach for Congress, as in Lois Lerner’s case, is to compel witness
testimony without offering any form of immunity.115 This tactic can
readily devolve into public shaming because the witness is forced to
assert her right to remain silent and refuse to answer questions in full
view of television cameras and the press.116 Further, technological
developments, such as congressional committee websites that livestream the hearings, ensure that the witness’s assertion of her
constitutional rights is subject to endless electronic airings via
websites such as YouTube.117 Therefore, to establish a more ethical
and appropriate approach to situations where a witness refuses to
answer questions based on a valid claim of Fifth Amendment
privilege, Congress should look to other analogous circumstances for
guidance.

113. See ROSENBERG, supra, note 60, at 13.
114. Id.
115. See Gregory Korte, Lois Lerner Wants Immunity in Exchange for IRS
Testimony, USA TODAY, Feb. 26, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/
2014/02/26/lois-lerner-wants-immunity-in-exchange-for-irs-testimony/5834321/.
116. Id. Lerner’s attorney noted that compelling her to appear before Congress
when the committee knew she would invoke the Fifth Amendment “accomplishes
nothing and needlessly embarrasses the witness.” Id.
117. For example, the House Oversight Committee provides video access to
recordings of its hearings and business meetings, including both hearings where
Lerner was present. The IRS: Targeting Americans for Their Political Beliefs,
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM (Mar. 5, 2014), http://oversight.
house.gov/hearing/irs-targeting-americans-political-beliefs/#.
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II. THREE APPROACHES TO BALANCING THE WITNESS’S
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION WITH OTHER
COMPELLING INTERESTS IN DIFFERENT LEGAL CONTEXTS
Currently, there is no universal, binding standard to determine
whether to compel an individual to appear before a congressional
committee when the individual intends to invoke the right against
self-incrimination.
To develop such a standard and balance
Congress’s investigatory authority with the individual constitutional
right against self-incrimination, it is prudent to examine how the Fifth
Amendment has been addressed in other legal contexts.
Congressional investigations are hardly the only arena where
witnesses assert their privilege against self-incrimination. In the
criminal context, when a witness intends to invoke his or her Fifth
Amendment right, prosecutors are counseled against compelling the
witness to testify,118 and defendants are often barred from calling the
witness.119 In the civil arena, an attorney is allowed to compel a
witness to testify, regardless of whether the witness intends to invoke
the right against self-incrimination.120 Finally, the D.C. Bar has issued
an advisory Ethics Opinion finding it ethically permissible to compel
a witness to appear so long as the sole purpose is not to pillory the
individual.121
A. Excusing the Witness from Appearing
During congressional hearings, a witness’s Fifth Amendment right
is pitted against Congress’s investigative mandate and legislative
function.122 In criminal cases, on the other hand, the individual’s right
to be free from self-incrimination can clash with the prosecution’s
efforts to prove the charges against the defendant and with the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation and compulsory process
rights. However, in both the congressional and criminal contexts, one
party may seek to compel a witness to testify despite the witness’s

118. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION
§ 3-5.7(c) (1993) (“A prosecutor should not call a witness in the presence of the jury
who the prosecutor knows will claim a valid privilege not to testify.”).
119. See, e.g., Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 689 (1931).
120. See generally Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976) (noting that an
individual can be called to testify in a civil proceeding even if that individual intends
to invoke his or her Fifth Amendment right).
121. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 358 (2011).
122. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 198 (1957) (“Accommodation of the
congressional need for particular information with the individual and personal
interest in privacy is an arduous and delicate task.”).
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intention to invoke the Fifth Amendment. It is therefore instructive
to consider how these conflicting interests are balanced in the
framework of a criminal prosecution.

1.

Prosecution Calling a Witness Who Will Take the Fifth

In a recurring scenario, the prosecution subpoenas a witness to
testify and learns that the witness intends to invoke his or her
privilege against self-incrimination.123 Nevertheless, the prosecution
often would prefer to call the witness to testify and have him assert
his Fifth Amendment right in the jury’s presence. In that situation,
the defendant is rendered unable to cross-examine the witness,
because the witness’s Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination trumps the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
confrontation right.124 Further, this leaves the jury to speculate to the
detriment of the accused about what the witness was afraid to
admit.125
In Namet v. United States, the Supreme Court considered whether
it was improper for the prosecution to call a witness to invoke his
Fifth Amendment right in front of the jury.126 The defendant in
Namet challenged his conviction for violating federal wagering tax
laws after the prosecution knowingly called two witnesses to testify
who both intended to claim their privilege against selfincrimination.127 The Court described two situations where calling
such a witness could merit reversal: (1) where the prosecutor
intentionally tries to prove his case from the inferences that arise
when a witness asserts his privilege against self-incrimination,128 and
(2) when the witness’s invocation aids the prosecution’s case.129 Based
on the facts in Namet, the Court upheld the defendant’s conviction,
because it found that there was no prosecutorial misconduct.130 The
Court further explained that the invocations of privilege were not “of
such significance in the trial that they constituted reversible error

123. See, e.g., Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 420 (1965); Namet v. United
States, 373 U.S. 179, 186–87 (1963).
124. See, e.g., United States v. Gullett, 713 F.2d 1203, 1208 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding
“the defendant’s right to discredit a prosecution witness on cross-examination cannot
overcome the witness’ privilege against self-incrimination”).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1959).
126. Namet, 373 U.S. at 186–87.
127. Id. at 180.
128. Id. at 186.
129. Id. at 187.
130. Id. at 189.
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even in the absence of prosecutorial misconduct.”131
Despite
upholding Namet’s conviction, the Court clearly expressed concern
with a defendant facing unfair prejudice when a witness’s refusal to
answer adds “critical weight to the prosecution’s case in a form not
subject to cross-examination.”132
The Court reaffirmed the Namet approach in Douglas v.
Alabama.133 In Douglas, the defendant was convicted of assault with
intent to murder.134 During the trial, while questioning a witness who
was asserting his right against self-incrimination, the prosecutor read
a document alleged to be a confession signed by the witness that
implicated the defendant.135 The Court overturned the conviction,
holding that an individual’s Sixth Amendment right is violated if the
“inferences from a witness’s refusal to answer added critical weight to
the prosecution’s case.”136 Thus, the Court reversed judgment in the
defendant’s favor because the denial of the right to cross examine was
not “a mere minor lapse” but played a fundamental role in the case
against Douglas.137 In light of this holding, the prosecution in a
criminal case must carefully balance the benefit of calling a witness
who intends to invoke the right against self-incrimination with the
risk of jeopardizing the prosecution.138
While the Court has wrestled with the constitutional question of
when, if ever, to allow the prosecution to call a witness it knows will
assert his Fifth Amendment rights, the ethical standard that guides
attorney action is clear. American Bar Association Standard 3-5.7(c)
(Standard 3-5.7(c)) provides that, “[a] prosecutor should not call a
witness in the presence of the jury who the prosecutor knows will
claim a valid privilege not to testify.”139 The plain language of
Standard 3-5.7(c) unequivocally urges the prosecution not to bring a
witness who will exercise his or her right not to testify before a jury.140
131. Id.
132. Id. at 187.
133. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 420 (1965).
134. Id. at 416.
135. Id. at 416–17.
136. Id. at 420 (quoting Namet, 373 U.S. at 187).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.7(c)
(1993).
140. Id. The Court has consistently expressed a preference for statutory
interpretation that adheres to the law’s plain meaning. See, e.g., United States v. Mo.
Pac. R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 279 (1929) (explaining “where the language of an
enactment is clear, and construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd or
impracticable consequences, the words employed are to be taken as the final

2014]

TO CALL OR NOT TO CALL

589

The Standard also clearly states that when a prosecutor knows a
witness will legitimately invoke the right not to testify, the prosecutor
“should not call” the witness.141 Further, Standard 3-5.7(c) is entitled
to substantial deference even though it is not a binding rule.142
The interpretation of Standard 3-5.7(c) as a blanket prohibition on
compelling witnesses to invoke their Fifth Amendment rights is
bolstered through comparison with a previous version of the
standard. The 1971 version of Standard 3-5.7(c) read, “[a] prosecutor
should not call a witness who the prosecutor knows will claim a valid
privilege not to testify for the purpose of impressing upon the jury the
fact of the claim of privilege.”143 The new version of Standard 3-5.7(c)
no longer makes the “purpose” for calling the witness dispositive or
even considers why the witness is called.144 Instead, prosecutors are
now admonished not to call a witness in the presence of the jury if
they are aware that the witness will invoke valid Fifth Amendment
rights.145
The Commentary to Standard 3-5.7(c) lends further support to this
interpretation. The Commentary states, “[i]f the prosecutor is
informed in advance that the witness will claim a privilege and wishes
to contest the claim, the matter should be treated without the
presence of the jury and a ruling obtained.”146 Even in contesting the
witness’s claim of Fifth Amendment privilege, the prosecutor should

expression of the meaning intended”). While Standard 3-5.7(c) is not legislation, the
same principles of interpretation are instructive.
141. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.7(c)
(1993).
142. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION
§ 3-1.1 (1993) (noting the “standards are intended to be used as a guide to
professional conduct and performance”). In Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134
(1944), the Court explained that Agency “rulings, interpretations, and opinions . . . do
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants
may properly resort for guidance.” Id. at 140. Similar to those of federal agencies,
the ABA Standards should be given a significant deference because of the ABA’s
expertise. Id. at 138 (explaining that the judgments of the Advisor of the Fair Labor
Standards Act are persuasive because of the Advisor’s “considerable experience”).
143. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.7(c)
(1971).
144. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.7(c)
(1993).
145. Id.; see Prosecutorial Misconduct, 91 GEO. L.J. 556, 565 (2003) (“It is
improper for a prosecutor to call a third-party witness knowing that the witness will
invoke his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, because the
jury might improperly infer guilt from the witness’s silence.”).
146. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.7(c)
cmt. at 105 (1993).
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not raise this challenge in front of the jury.147 This reflects the strong
preference for preventing an individual who seeks to assert his or her
Fifth Amendment rights from being compelled to do so publicly and
in front of a jury.148 Based on the plain language, history, and
commentary to Standard 3-5.7(c), it is apparent that the ethical
standard counsels the prosecution against calling a witness to assert
his or her right against compelled self-incrimination.

2.

Defense Calling or Questioning a Witness Who Will Take or
Already Has Asserted the Fifth Amendment Privilege

The propriety and constitutionality of requiring a witness to invoke
his rights in the jury’s presence must be viewed through a different
lens when it is the defendant who seeks to call the witness. In
criminal cases, the Sixth Amendment gives the accused the right to
confront the witnesses against him and to present evidence on his
behalf.149 On the other hand, the Fifth Amendment affords witnesses
the right to refuse to testify in order to avoid self-incrimination.150
Thus, there are two competing individual constitutional rights
implicated when considering whether a defendant may call a witness
who will assert his or her Fifth Amendment right.
The Court resolved this conflict by, in effect, exalting the Fifth
Amendment in the landmark case Alford v. United States. In Alford,
the defendant, Alford, was convicted of mail fraud.151 At trial, Alford
was denied the ability to question a witness regarding where he
lived.152 The defense sought to question the witness about his address
to establish that the witness was currently in federal custody and show
that his incriminating testimony against Alford was biased.153 The
district court denied the defense’s request to question the witness, and
Alford was eventually convicted.154 Alford appealed his conviction,

147. See id.; see also Michael J. Davidson, Congressional Investigations and Their
Effect on Subsequent Military Process, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 281, 291 (2006).
148. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 35.7(c) cmt. at 105 (1993).
149. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
150. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
151. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 688 (1931).
152. Id. at 688–89.
153. Id. at 689–90, 693 (explaining “[t]he purpose obviously was . . . to show by
such facts as proper cross-examination might develop, that his testimony was biased
because given under promise or expectation of immunity, or under the coercive effect
of his detention by officers of the United States, which was conducting the present
prosecution”).
154. Id. at 688.
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and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that “no obligation is
imposed on the court . . . to protect a witness from being discredited
on cross-examination.”155 However the Court limited its holding by
explaining that where a defendant “attempt[s] invasion of [the
witness’s] constitutional protection from self incrimination . . . [t]here
is a duty to protect [the witness] from questions which go beyond the
bonds of proper cross-examination merely to harass, annoy or
humiliate him.”156 In other words, the Court held that a witness’s
assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment can trump the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.157
Alford illustrates the Court’s view of the depth, breadth, and
importance of the invocation of Fifth Amendment rights.
Although a witness cannot be compelled to testify on the basis of
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, the question remains
whether the defendant can force the witness to invoke his or her Fifth
Amendment rights in front of the jury. In general, the same rule that
binds the prosecution applies to the accused; the defendant may not
call a witness simply to have the witness invoke his privilege against
self-incrimination in front of the jury.158 For example, the First Circuit
in United States v. Santiago,159 the Fourth Circuit in United States v.
Branch,160 and the D.C. Circuit in Bowles v. United States,161 have all
concluded that the defense cannot call a witness to testify solely to
compel them to assert their Fifth Amendment right in front of the
jury.
The First Circuit, in Santiago, held that the defendant could not
force two witnesses who planned to invoke their right against selfincrimination to testify.162 The defendant in Santiago challenged his

155. Id. at 694.
156. Id.
157. See id.
158. See, e.g., United States v. Santiago, 566 F.3d 65, 70 (1st Cir. 2009); United
States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 342 (4th Cir. 2008); Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d
536, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see also, Terrence Kerwin, Comment, Compulsory Process

and the Right to Present a Defense: Why a Criminal Defendant Should Have the
Ability to Force a Witness Who Will “Take the Fifth” to Do So in Front of the Jury,
112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 659, 670 (2007) (arguing that a criminal defendant should have
the ability to call the witness in front of the jury); Diana Luka-Hopson, Note, The

Existing Conflict Between the Defendant’s Right of Confrontation and the Witness’s
Right to Avoid Self-Incrimination: A Constitutional Dilemma, 38 CATH. U. L. REV.
245, 268 (1988).
159. 566 F.3d at 70.
160. 537 F.3d at 342.
161. 439 F.2d at 542.
162. 566 F.3d at 68, 70.
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conviction for drug trafficking, arguing that he was denied his
confrontation rights because he was not allowed to call two witnesses
for questioning.163 While recognizing that the defendant had a right to
present a complete defense, the First Circuit held that the defendant
“was not . . . entitled to call the witnesses merely to have them assert
their privilege before the jury.”164 The First Circuit explained its
holding by noting that “[b]ecause a jury may not draw any legitimate
inferences from a witness’ decision to exercise his Fifth Amendment
privilege, . . . neither the prosecution nor the defense may call a
witness to the stand simply to compel him to invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination.”165
In Branch, the Fourth Circuit also affirmed the denial of the
defendant’s request to call a witness whom the district court knew
would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege.166 In this case, the
defendant, Branch, was convicted of possession and distribution of
cocaine base and illegal possession of a firearm.167 During trial,
Branch sought to call a witness, Johnson, arguing that it was
“necessary because the jury could have concluded that Johnson, not
Branch, owned the cocaine base and firearm found in the
Mercedes.”168 The district court did not allow Branch to call Johnson
to the stand, and the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s
decision. The Fourth Circuit explained that “placing Johnson on the
stand solely to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege would lead to
‘unfair prejudice’ in the form of both unwarranted speculation by the
jury and the government’s inability to cross-examine Johnson.”169
The Fourth Circuit also noted that “any inferences that the jury might
have drawn from Johnson’s privilege assertion would have been only
minimally probative—and likely improper—in any event.”170
Similarly, in Bowles, the D.C. Circuit held that the defense could
not call a witness to testify if the witness indicated that he would
assert his right against self-incrimination.171 In Bowles, the defendant,
Bowles, was convicted of first degree murder and assault with intent

163. Id. at 68.
164. Id. at 70.
165. Id. (quoting United States v. Rivas-Macias, 537 F.3d 1271, 1275 n.3 (10th Cir.
2008)).
166. United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 342 (4th Cir. 2008).
167. Id. at 331.
168. Id. at 342.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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to rob.172 The district court refused to allow the defense to call a
witness to the stand after ascertaining that the witness would decline
to answer questions pursuant to his right against self-incrimination.173
Bowles appealed his conviction, arguing the district court wrongly
prevented him from calling the witness. In affirming the district
court’s decision, the D.C. Circuit began by noting, “[i]t is well settled
that the jury is not entitled to draw any inferences from the decision
of a witness to exercise his constitutional privilege whether those
inferences be favorable to the prosecution or the defense.”174
Following this conclusion, the court explained, “[a]n obvious
corollary . . . is the rule that a witness should not be put on the stand
for the purpose of having him exercise his privilege before the
jury.”175 The court came to this conclusion based on the concern that
allowing the defense to call a witness under such circumstances
“would only invite the jury to make an improper inference.”176
Accordingly, the Bowles court upheld the district court’s decision to
prevent the defendant from calling the witness.177
Thus, in the criminal prosecution context, courts and ethical
standards side with the Fifth Amendment even when balancing it
against the state’s interest in prosecuting individuals and the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights of confrontation and
compulsory process. As demonstrated by the Supreme Court as well
as multiple Circuit Courts of Appeals, courts are disinclined to allow
the prosecution or the defense to call witnesses who intend to invoke
their privilege against self-incrimination.178 This result reflects the
importance of the individual right against self-incrimination, even to
the legal profession,179 and flows naturally from the recognition that

172. Id. at 537.
173. Id. at 541.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 542.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 541.
178. See, e.g., Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 187 (1963) (acknowledging
that theoretically there is a concern that compelling a witness to invoke his or her
Fifth Amendment right will unfairly affect the jury); United States v. Santiago, 566
F.3d 65, 70 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 342 (4th Cir.
2008); Bowles, 439 F.2d at 542; ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.7(c) (1993).
179. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION
§ 3-5.7(c) (expressly protecting a witness from being called to testify when they have
a valid claim to the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination).
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jurors might wrongly draw inferences from the witness’s failure to
answer questions.180
B.

Compelling the Witness to Appear and Invoke the Fifth
Amendment Privilege

Although the explicit language of the Fifth Amendment refers to
criminal proceedings,181 the Supreme Court has extended its
protection to any proceeding, including civil cases.182 The right of the
individual witness to avoid making incriminating statements may
conflict with the general overarching public policy of ensuring the
parties receive fairness and justice.183 To balance these competing
interests, in civil proceedings and federal court, an individual may
assert his or her constitutional right, but the factfinder can draw a
negative inference based on this decision.184 In other words, while a
witness can invoke the Fifth Amendment in civil proceedings, a
factfinder may make inferences based on the refusal to answer certain
questions.185
In McCarthy v. Arndstein, debtor Arndstein was adjudged an
involuntary bankrupt and was subpoenaed to appear before a special
commissioner to examine his assets.186
During questioning,
Arndstein, citing his Fifth Amendment privilege, refused to answer
certain questions which tended to incriminate him and was eventually
held in contempt.187 On appeal, the Supreme Court held that
Arndstein was entitled to decline to answer certain questions
pursuant to his right against self-incrimination.188 Thus, the Court
enabled witnesses to assert their Fifth Amendment rights in civil

180. Bowles, 439 F.2d at 541.
181. The Fifth Amendment states “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis
added).
182. See McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) (holding that “[t]he
privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which the
testimony is sought or is to be used”).
183. See, e.g., Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692, 694 (1931) (considering
the ability to cross-examine the witness as part of the right to a fair trial, but
nevertheless holding that the Fifth Amendment right trumps).
184. See, e.g., Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976) (describing “the
prevailing rule” that in civil actions, adverse inferences can be drawn when a witness
refuses to testify pursuant to his or her Fifth Amendment privilege).
185. Id.
186. McCarthy, 266 U.S. at 38.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 40.
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proceedings.189 The Court’s reasoning in Arndstein is explicitly
expanded in Kastigar v. United States, which held that privilege
applies “in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or
judicial, investigatory or adjudicative” where the witness reasonably
believes that the information sought could be used against him or her
in a subsequent proceeding.190
While the Court in McCarthy extended the Fifth Amendment
protection beyond criminal proceedings, invoking the right against
self-incrimination does not come without costs.191 For instance, in
Baxter v. Palmigiano, Palmigiano, an incarcerated individual in the
Rhode Island Adult Correction Institution, challenged the prison’s
disciplinary hearing process as unconstitutional.192 The prison’s policy
allowed individuals to assert their Fifth Amendment right, but this
silence could be used against them.193 The Supreme Court upheld the
prison’s approach, explaining, “the Fifth Amendment does not forbid
adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to
testify in response to probative evidence offered against them.”194
The Court emphasized that the negative inference was justified
because the disciplinary hearing was not a criminal proceeding and
therefore the stakes were lower.195
After Baxter, in federal court, a party can comment on the
witness’s assertion of his or her rights and ask the factfinder to draw a
negative inference from this silence, such as that the witness engaged
in improper or wrongful conduct.196 The Supreme Court’s holding in
Baxter is particularly relevant to the question of whether a party can
call a witness who intends to take the Fifth.197 Federal courts allow a
party to call a witness to testify and assert his or her Fifth
Amendment right.198 As a natural corollary to this rule, a party must
first be able to compel the witness’s testimony in the presence of the

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1972).
See, e.g., Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976).
Id. at 313.
Id. at 318.

Id.
Id. at 318–19.
Id. Notably, many states do not permit adverse inferences in this context.
See, e.g., Fuller v. Super. Ct. of L.A. Cnty., 87 Cal. App. 4th 299, 311 (2001)
(balancing concerns of fairness and right against self-incrimination without explicitly
supporting the permission of adverse inferences).
197. See Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318.
198. Id.
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factfinder.199 If the witness is not compelled to testify, then there is no
way for a factfinder to draw any inference from the witness. It
follows that in civil cases, a party may compel a witness to actually
appear and assert his or her privilege against self-incrimination.200 The
civil approach of allowing witnesses to be compelled to assert their
Fifth Amendment privilege has proven influential in determining
whether individuals should be compelled to appear before
Congress.201
C. Compelling the Witness to Appear Unless the Sole Purpose
for Requiring the Witness to Appear is to Pillory or Humiliate
In the congressional context, the D.C. Bar has offered advisory
guidance on the narrower issue of the congressional staff lawyer’s
ethical duty.202 Specifically, the D.C. Bar addressed whether a
congressional staff lawyer violates his or her ethical duties by
compelling a witness to appear before a committee when the witness
intends to assert the right to remain silent.203 In two ethics opinions,
the D.C. Bar has attempted to find equilibrium between the
individual constitutional right against self-incrimination204 and
Congress’s need to conduct oversight and investigations in
199. See, e.g., id. (noting the Fifth Amendment right is not a complete bar to
calling a witness to testify particularly with the adverse inference rule). As with
adverse inferences, many states take a different view and do not permit witnesses to
be called to testify when a party has advance knowledge that the witness will refuse
to answer questions. See, e.g., People v. Frierson, 53 Cal.3d 730, 743 (Cal. 1991)
(calling a witness a lawyer knows will invoke the Fifth Amendment can only serve to
“invite the jury to make an improper inference” and waste the court’s time). On
occasion, even a federal court will refuse to permit a witness to testify when it is
aware that the witness will assert a Fifth Amendment privilege. See, e.g., Arredondo
v. Ortiz, 365 F.3d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 2004).
200. See generally Nancy C. Wear, Taking the 5th: How to Pierce the Testimonial
Shield, ABA BUSINESS LAW SECTION (May/June 2000), http://apps.americanbar.org/
buslaw/blt/blt00may-shield.html (discussing how to depose an individual who plans to
assert the right against self-incrimination clearly implying counsel’s ability to call that
witness to testify).
201. See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 358 (2011) (discussing Baxter in
determining “whether it is proper for a congressional committee whose chairman,
staff and several members are attorneys to require a witness who is a ‘target’ of a
pending grand jury investigation to appear at televised hearings to be questioned
when the committee has been notified in advance that the witness will exercise his
constitutional privilege not to answer any questions”).
202. See id.; D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 31 (1977).
203. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 358 (2011); D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm.,
Op. 31 (1977).
204. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 198 (1957) (noting subpoenaed
information that is “unrelated to any legislative purpose” must yield to the individual
right to privacy).
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furtherance of its legislative role.205 While the opinions offer insight
into this issue, they remain non-binding advisory opinions, like all
ethics opinions.206 Further, the opinions only directly apply to staff
attorneys acting in their capacities as lawyers because “[i]t is not
within our province to pass upon the proprietary conduct by
congressmen, who may or may not be lawyers, but are acting in any
event as congressman.”207 Despite its limited scope and advisory
nature, the D.C. Bar has offered helpful insight into the issue of
whether witnesses should be compelled to appear before Congress to
assert their Fifth Amendment rights.
In 1977, the D.C. Bar first addressed this issue in D.C. Legal Ethics
Opinion 31 (Opinion 31).208 In Opinion 31, the D.C. Bar advised on:
[W]hether it is proper for a congressional committee whose
chairman, staff and several members are attorneys to require a
witness who is a ‘target’ of a pending grand jury investigation to
appear at televised hearings to be questioned when the committee
has been notified in advance that the witness will exercise his
constitutional privilege not to answer any questions.”209

The Opinion began by noting that regardless of the publicity and
potential damage to a witness’s reputation, “[i]t is not per se improper
for an attorney acting as counsel for a congressional committee to
cause a witness to be summoned in furtherance of a legitimate
legislative function of Congress.”210 Opinion 31 recognized that, when
Congress is acting pursuant to a legitimate legislative function, it may
be appropriate to require a witness to appear before a committee.211
After determining that there may be instances where it is ethical to
compel a witness to appear before a congressional committee,
Opinion 31 acknowledged that when a person intends to invoke his or
her Fifth Amendment right, “no information will be obtained and the
sole effect of the summons will be to pillory the witness.”212 In such
situations, Opinion 31 explained that the witness should not be

205. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927) (recognizing Congress’s
authority to conduct investigations because “[a] legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change”).
206. See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 31 (1977).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See id.
212. Id.
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compelled to appear.213 Notably, Opinion 31 cites to ABA Standard
3-5.7(c) as a source of support for its conclusion, which as discussed
above, counsels prosecutors against compelling witnesses to appear
before the jury to claim their Fifth Amendment privilege.214 The D.C.
Bar summarized its view by stating, “it appears clear that the conduct
described in the inquiry [compelling a witness to appear where no
information will be obtained because the witness will invoke his or
her constitutional right] is improper.”215
In January 2011, the D.C. Bar was asked to vacate Opinion 31, and,
in response, it promulgated Opinion 358.216 While the D.C. Bar
“decline[d] [the] request to vacate Opinion 31,”217 it did clarify its
opinion and, in the process, revised Opinion 31. Opinion 358 began
by restating that Opinion 31 “does not establish a per se rule that
compelling a witness to testify before a congressional committee
when it is known in advance that the witness will invoke the Fifth
Amendment privilege violates the ethics rules.”218 This initial
statement is a near verbatim recitation of the D.C. Bar’s
determination in Opinion 31.219
After this initial reaffirmation, Opinion 358 explained that “an
attorney violates the ethics rules only when he knows that summoning
a witness to appear (1) will provide no information to the committee
and (2) is intended merely to degrade the witness.”220 Unless both
conditions are met, an attorney can compel the witness to appear
without violating an ethical duty.221 This reformulation holds that it is
ethical for an attorney to call a witness even if the sole intent is to
degrade him or her, so long as the witness will provide some
information to the committee.222 Similarly, even if an attorney
believes that the witness will not provide any information to the
committee, the attorney can still compel the witness to appear
publicly so long as the attorney’s sole intent is not to degrade the
witness.223 This reformulation affords attorneys a great deal of

213. Id.
214. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.7(c)
(1993).
215. See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 31 (1977).
216. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 358 (2011).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 31 (1977).
220. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 358 (2011).
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id.
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latitude in calling witnesses to appear publicly before congressional
committees to invoke their constitutional rights.224 Opinion 358
therefore makes it easier for attorneys to compel witnesses to invoke
their Fifth Amendment rights before Congress while acting in
accordance with the D.C. Bar’s advisory ethical guidelines.225
Further, Opinion 358’s broad understanding of what constitutes a
“legitimate purpose” for calling a witness will encourage attorneys to
compel witnesses to publicly claim the right against selfincrimination.226 Specifically, Opinion 358 asserts that requiring a
witness to appear before a congressional committee to determine
whether the individual will in fact invoke the right against selfincrimination is a legitimate reason to bring a witness before
Congress in a public setting.227 The D.C. Bar went on to explain that
calling a witness to make such a determination is a legitimate reason
for calling a witness, but it is not exclusive.228 This conclusion
empowers an attorney to always be able to compel an individual to
appear before Congress because there is no way to unequivocally
determine whether a witness will invoke the right against selfincrimination before he or she actually does so.229
The permissive language in Opinion 358 is a stark departure from
Opinion 31.230 Opinion 31 explained that “[t]here is certainly no need
to have the test of claim of privilege take place in a televised open
hearing with the resultant inevitable prejudicial publicity for the
witness.”231 Opinion 31 continued, “[i]nsofar as the attorney has some
question whether the witness will in fact claim his privilege if called,
this question can be resolved by calling the witness in an executive
session.”232 Whereas Opinion 31 explicitly urged against compelling
an individual to publicly assert his or her Fifth Amendment right,
Opinion 358 determined that testing the claim of privilege in a public
hearing is a legitimate purpose for calling a witness.233 Therefore, the

224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. Id.
228. See id. (stating “[w]e do not read the Opinion to mean, however, that the only
legitimate purpose for calling a witness is to determine whether he will assert the
privilege”).
229. See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 358 (2011).
230. See id.
231. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 31 (1977).
232. Id.
233. See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 358 (2011); D.C. Bar Legal Ethics
Comm., Op. 31 (1977).
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approach outlined in Opinion 358 expands the situations where a
lawyer can compel an individual to appear before Congress to
publicly assert his or her constitutional rights while adhering to the
D.C. Bar’s ethics opinion.234 While Opinion 358 is not compulsory, it
remains a persuasive ethics opinion that broadly condones compelling
witnesses to appear before Congress to assert the right against selfincrimination.235
III. HOW TO BALANCE THE RIGHT AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION WITH CONGRESS’ S LEGISLATIVE POWER: DO
NOT COMPEL WITNESS TESTIMONY
To ethically and effectively find equilibrium between these
competing interests, members of Congress should follow the
approach taken in criminal litigation and not compel witness
testimony once counsel has informed Congress that the witness will
assert his or her Fifth Amendment right.236 Implementing such an
approach would not require legislative action or judicial holdings.
Instead, both chambers of Congress would simply have to adopt their
own rules prohibiting compelled attendance when a witness informs
Congress that he or she will claim a valid right against selfincrimination.237 This approach properly reflects the spirit of the
ethics opinions, balances the individual Fifth Amendment privilege
with Congress’s legislative interests, and ensures that Congress
obtains accurate and reliable information to aid in the legislative
process. Conversely, compelling a witness to testify and allowing a

234. See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 358 (2011).
235. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION
§ 3-1.1 (1993) (noting the “standards are intended to be used as a guide to
professional conduct and performance”).
236. This proposal assumes that the witness intends to invoke a valid Fifth
Amendment claim. A congressional committee can review a witness’s assertion of
privilege to determine its validity, but the witness is not required to provide exact
specificity. In judicial proceedings, the Supreme Court has advised, “[t]o sustain the
privilege, it need only be evident, from the implications of the question, in the setting
in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why
it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.”
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1951).
237. The Senate changes its Standing Rules through simple resolutions, which can
be adopted by a Senate majority. See RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R42929, PROCEDURES FOR CONSIDERING CHANGES IN SENATE RULES 1–2 (2013),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42929.pdf. Similarly, the House of
Representatives adopts its rules by passing simple resolutions with a majority vote.
See WM. HOLMES BROWN ET AL., HOUSE PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO THE RULES,
PRECEDENTS, AND PROCEDURES OF THE HOUSE 838 (2011), available at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-HPRACTICE-112/pdf/GPO-HPRACTICE-112.pdf.
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negative inference to be drawn from silence is inconsistent with
ethical opinions, undermines the Fifth Amendment, and will result in
legislation based on speculation. Similarly, allowing witnesses to be
called so long as the sole purpose of compelling the witness is not to
pillory him or her is the functional equivalent of the civil approach
and implicates the same ethical, constitutional, and policy concerns
inherent in the civil context.
A. Ethical Reasons Not to Compel Public Assertion of Fifth
Amendment Right
Members of Congress should follow the approach utilized in
criminal litigation because congressional oversight, with its
increasingly adversarial approach in high-profile investigations, has
effectively become a means of public legislative trial.238 Further,
congressional hearings often spur criminal investigations.239 As James
Hamilton, partner with Bingham McCutchen LLP, Robert F. Muse,
partner with Mitchell & Mezines, and Kevin R. Amer, attorney with
the U.S. Department of Justice, explain in their article analyzing
congressional investigations:
Prosecutors read the newspapers and watch television. A comment
from the chairman that the witness may have violated criminal law is
difficult to ignore and prosecutors have been known to initiate
investigations based on concerns expressed by the committee. And,
ongoing criminal investigations have been reshaped by the
testimony of congressional witnesses.240

Because of the interrelated nature between criminal prosecutions
and congressional hearings, the ethical rules that govern criminal
prosecutions should also be applied to congressional hearings. In
fact, in issuing its initial ethical opinion regarding whether individuals
should be compelled to appear publicly to assert the right to remain
silent, the D.C. Bar relied on the legal and ethical standards that
apply in criminal proceedings.241

238. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-16 (1980) (noting that the
activities of a legislature may assume the characteristics of an adversary proceeding);
D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 31 (1977) (analogizing congressional
investigations to criminal proceedings).
239. See James Hamilton et al., Congressional Investigations: Politics and Process,
44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1115, 1171–72 (2007).
240. Id.
241. See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 31 (1977). The Opinion cited to ABA
Standard 3-5.7(c), Standard 3-3.6(e), and cases that held that summoning a witness in
such circumstances constituted prosecutorial misconduct and potentially required
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If congressional oversight hearings are treated like criminal
proceedings, Standard 3-5.7(c) should guide members of Congress
when deciding whether to bring a witness before the committee.242 As
discussed in Part II, Standard 3-5.7(c) counsels the prosecution
against calling a witness in the presence of the jury when the
prosecutor knows the witness will claim a valid privilege against
testifying.243 In the congressional hearing context, Standard 3-5.7(c)
would advise members of Congress—who act as the prosecutor as
well as the judge and jury during hearings—against calling witnesses
to appear before a committee.244 In congressional hearings, members
of Congress act as the prosecution by determining what issues to
investigate and bring before the committee. They also act as the
judge because they control the hearing’s procedure. Additionally,
they act as the jury because they make the ultimate findings of fact
through reports and legislation.
Applying Standard 3-5.7(c) to Congress would mean that once a
witness informs the committee that he or she will invoke a valid claim
of Fifth Amendment privilege, the witness will not be compelled to
appear before the committee in a public hearing. For example, as
soon as the House Oversight Committee was informed that Lerner
intended to invoke her Fifth Amendment right, it should not have
compelled her presence at a public hearing. This is not to say that the
Committee would be prohibited from using alternative methods—
such as urging her to appear before the committee or requesting
written testimony—to try to obtain the relevant information or
convince her to testify. It simply precludes requiring her to appear at
a public congressional hearing.
Following Standard 3-5.7(c)’s
guidance in the congressional context would thereby create a clear
and easily applicable standard for determining whether to require a
witness to testify.245

reversal of criminal convictions. See, e.g., United States v. Coppola, 479 F.2d 1153
(10th Cir. 1959); San Fratello v. United States, 340 F.2d 560 (3d. Cir. 1959).
242. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.7(c)
(1993).
243. Id. Similarly, ABA Standard 3-3.6(e) asserts, “[t]he prosecutor should not
compel the appearance of a witness before the grand jury whose activities are the
subject of the inquiry if the witness states in advance that if called he or she will
exercise the constitutional privilege not to testify.” ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.6(e) (1993).
244. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION
§ 3-5.7(c) (1993).
245. See id.

2014]

TO CALL OR NOT TO CALL

603

Further, Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 4.4 (Rule 4.4)
lends additional support to applying Standard 3-5.7(c) to Congress.246
Rule 4.4 counsels against compelling witness testimony when the
witness intends to assert his or her right against self-incrimination.247
Rule 4.4 advises further that “a lawyer shall not use means that have
no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a
third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the
legal rights of such a person.”248 D.C. Bar’s discussion in Opinion 31
supports the conclusion that requiring a witness to invoke the Fifth
Amendment privilege before a panel of members of Congress as well
as reporters, video cameras, and the public has no other substantial
purpose beyond pillorying the individual.249 Opinion 31 noted that
once an individual expresses an intent to invoke a valid Fifth
Amendment claim, the committee will obtain no information from
the witness.250 The Opinion continues to explain that, in this situation,
there is no need to test the claim of privilege in an open hearing
because of “the resultant inevitable prejudicial publicity for the
witness.”251 Therefore, because calling a witness to invoke the Fifth
Amendment will yield no information and will harm the witness
because of the negative publicity, the primary purpose behind calling
a witness in this context is to pillory him or her.252
The Lois Lerner controversy serves as a clear example of such
harm to an individual.253 Lerner was forced to appear before the
Oversight Committee on two separate occasions, despite stating that
she intended to invoke her constitutional right and then actually
doing so.254 Before both hearings—but particularly after her first
compelled appearance—there was no realistic possibility that Lerner
would provide the committee with any useful information, because
she had already stated through her attorney that she would not

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2013).
Id.
Id.
See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 31 (1977).
See id.
Id.
See id.
See generally Josh Hicks, Central Figure in IRS Tea Party Controversy
Resigns, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
federal_government/central-figure-in-irs-tea-party-controversy-resigns/2013/09/23/
db0d3d28-248a-11e3-b75d-5b7f66349852_story.html.
254. See generally Mark Memmott, Ex-IRS Official Invokes 5th Amendment
Again, Then Things Get Hot, NPR (Mar. 05, 2014, 11:42 AM ET),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/03/05/286231779/ex-irs-official-invokes5th-amendment-again-then-things-get-hot.
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answer questions. It seems indisputable that the primary (if not sole)
purpose of compelling Lerner to appear was to publicly embarrass
her and thereby win political points.255 This runs counter to both the
spirit and plain language of Rule 4.4, which discourages using tactics
of obtaining evidence that have no substantial purpose beyond
embarrassing a third party.256 It is also inconsistent with Opinion 31
and Opinion 358, which both counsel against calling witnesses merely
to pillory them.257
The Comment to Rule 4.4 bolsters the case against compelling
witness testimony.258 The Comment states that “a lawyer may not
disregard the rights of third persons.”259 Compelling a witness to
appear to assert his or her right against self-incrimination in a public
congressional hearing clearly conveys an indifference to, if not disdain
for, the Fifth Amendment.
For example, Congressman Jack
Brooks’s260 questioning of Lieutenant North during the Iran-Contra
congressional hearing clearly demonstrated such “disregard” for the
Fifth Amendment. In that hearing, Congressman Brooks said to
Lieutenant North, “[y]ou’ve stated, numerous times during the past
few days, that you didn’t think you’d broken laws and you may not
have. In any case, . . . if you felt so strongly that you hadn’t, I had a
little difficulty understanding your reluctance to testify without
immunity.”261 This type of questioning reflects a sense that the Fifth
Amendment is “a spurious defense by those who sought to conceal
spurious acts.”262 It reveals a general disregard for the Fifth
Amendment as a foundational constitutional right. Accordingly,
pursuant to the Comment to Rule 4.4, witnesses should not be

255. See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman, Some Republicans See I.R.S. Troubles as Means
to a Big Goal: Tax Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/06/04/us/politics/some-republicans-see-irs-scandal-yielding-tax-reform.html
(reporting that some “Republicans see the cloud around the I.R.S. in the light of raw
politics and how much damage it can do to President Obama”).
256. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2013).
257. See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 358 (2011); D.C. Bar Legal Ethics
Comm., Op. 31 (1977).
258. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 1.
259. Id.
260. See generally Douglas Martin, Jack Brooks, Former Texas Congressman, Dies
at 89, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/06/us/politics/jackbrooks-former-texas-congressman-dies-at-89.html?_r=0. Jack Brooks was a member
of Congress representing East Texas from 1967–1995.
261. Iran-Contra Hearings: Sharp Words on Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1987,
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/14/world/iran-contra-hearings-sharp-words-onimmunity.html.
262. Friedelbaum, supra note 68, at 508.
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compelled to testify merely to assert their constitutional right because
doing so actually serves to denigrate the individual’s right.
Further, congressional hearings also implicate the individual desire
to be free from public shaming and humiliation.263 In Emspak and
Quinn, the Supreme Court recognized the harsh impact on an
individual forced to assert his Fifth Amendment rights in a public,
investigative setting.264 In fact, the government candidly argued in
those cases that the witness failed to invoke his Fifth Amendment
rights because he deliberately phrased his objections in equivocal
ways “to obtain the benefit of the privilege without invoking the
popular opprobrium which often attends to its exercise.”265 The Court
also acknowledged the harsh price often paid when someone asserts
his or her Fifth Amendment rights by referring to the potential
“stigma” that attaches to Fifth Amendment invocation.266 Similarly,
Justice Douglas trenchantly observed in his dissent in United States v.
Welden:
There was a time when a committee, knowing that a witness would
not answer a question by reason of the Fifth Amendment, would not
put the question to him. Today, witnesses who invoke the Fifth
Amendment at the threshold have been minutely examined,
apparently to see how many times they can be forced to invoke it.
Hearings have indeed often become a spectacle . . . But the more I
see of the awesome power of government to ruin people, to drive
them from public life, to brand them forever as undesirable, the
deeper I feel that protective measures are needed.267

Justice Douglas’s comments are made all the more powerful
considering that he expressed these concerns at a time before the

263. See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 164 (1955); Emspak v. United
States, 349 U.S. 190, 195 (1955).
264. See Quinn, 349 U.S. 155; Emspak, 349 U.S. 190.
265. Emspak, 349 U.S. at 202 n.9 (emphasis added).
266. Id. at 195. The Court held that the fear of “opprobrium” and the possibility
that a witness would less than clearly articulate his privilege against self-incrimination
should actually make congressional committee members more ready to recognize
“veiled” claims of privilege. Id. at 195, 202 n.9.
267. 377 U.S. 95, 118, 123 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (upholding the conviction
of a defendant, despite being granted immunity to testify before Congress pursuant
to the Act of February 25, 1903). A recent example of the kind of “spectacle”
bemoaned by Justice Douglas was the interrogation of Enron executive Ken Lay
after he asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege. See Greg Hitt,, Lay Refuses to
Answer Questions of Frustrated Senate Committee, WALL ST. J, Feb. 13, 2002,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1013532303399399160 (noting how, after
invoking his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, “Mr. Lay was forced
to sit through a series of finger-wagging lectures by 20 committee members, many of
them frustrated, many mocking”).
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Internet enabled individuals around the world to view congressional
hearings instantly and repeatedly. Considering the Comment to Rule
4.4 and the Court’s concern for the potential shaming effect of
compelling public testimony, members of Congress should decline to
require witnesses to invoke their Fifth Amendment rights in public
hearings.
Although the D.C. Bar attempted to strike a fair balance between
these competing interests in adopting Opinion 358, Congress should
not follow the approach described in Opinion 358 because it is
inconsistent with Opinion 31, as well as Standard 3-5.7(c), and Rule
4.4. Opinion 358 is at odds with these other relevant opinions
because it effectively allows a member of Congress to compel any
witness to appear before a committee so long as the sole purpose of
compelling the witness is not to pillory him or her.268 Further,
Opinion 358 provides that one legitimate reason for compelling a
witness is to determine whether the witness will actually assert his or
her right.269 This determination will always allow a committee to
force a witness to appear before the committee because the only way
to definitively prove that a witness will invoke the right against selfincrimination is by forcing the witness to do so publicly. Put simply,
Opinion 358 grants near-universal authority to compel testimony,
which is in conflict with the other relevant ethical opinions. As noted
above, Opinion 31, Standard 3-5.7(c), and Rule 4.4 strongly
discourage requiring an individual to appear merely to assert his or
her constitutional right. Accordingly, Opinion 358’s excessively
permissive language should not be followed by members of Congress.
B.

Constitutional Reasons That Congress Should Not Be Able
to Compel Public Assertion of Fifth Amendment Rights

In balancing the competing interests implicated in compelling
testimony, the individual’s constitutional right should outweigh
Congress’s general interest in conducting investigations for two
reasons. First, allowing witnesses to be forced to publicly assert their
constitutional right against self-incrimination fails to give proper
deference to the Fifth Amendment.270 Second, and relatedly, it
undermines the Fifth Amendment’s legitimacy.271 Accordingly, a
witness should not be compelled to invoke a valid claim of Fifth
268. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 358 (2011).
269. Id.
270. Quinn, 349 U.S. at 162.
271. See id. at 161–62; see also Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197–98
(1957).
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Amendment privilege before Congress in a public hearing because of
the detrimental and delegitimizing effect it will have on a
fundamental constitutional right.
Members of Congress should not be permitted to require
individuals to assert their Fifth Amendment rights in public, because
it is antithetical to the basic principle of preventing self-incrimination
enshrined in the constitutional right. The Supreme Court described
this right as “a privilege of great value, a protection to the innocent
though a shelter to the guilty, and a safeguard against heedless,
unfounded, or tyrannical prosecutions.”272 Additionally, in Quinn, the
Court explained that “the Self-Incrimination Clause ‘must be
accorded liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to
secure.’”273 In light of the Court’s characterization of the right as a
precious protection against tyranny and the Court’s recognition that it
should be liberally interpreted, this constitutional bulwark should be
prioritized over Congress’s general investigative role.274 Therefore, to
uphold the right, members of Congress should not force individuals to
testify merely to assert their privilege.
Furthermore, forcing individuals to assert their Fifth Amendment
right delegitimizes the constitutional prohibition against selfincrimination. The Court in Quinn expressed that, “[t]o apply the
privilege narrowly or begrudgingly—to treat it as an historical relic, at
most merely to be tolerated—is to ignore its development and
purpose.”275 By calling witnesses to appear in public hearings simply
to assert their constitutional rights in front of the cameras breeds the
exact type of begrudging disrespect the Court warned against in
Quinn.276 In fact, Congress’s practice of compelling individuals to
appear at congressional hearings in the 1950s is what led to the rise of
the pejorative “Fifth Amendment Communist.”277 To stop breeding
distaste for a cherished constitutional right, Congress should cease its
practice of compelling witness testimony once a witness expresses
intent to invoke the right against self-incrimination. As the Court
explained, “[i]t is precisely at such times—when the privilege is under
attack by those who wrongly conceive of it as merely a shield for the

272. Quinn, 349 U.S. at 162 (quoting Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 91
(1908)).
273. Id. (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)).
274. See id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. O’Neill, supra note 34, at 2515.
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guilty—that governmental bodies must be most scrupulous in
protecting its exercise.”278
C.

Legislative Policy Reasons Not to Compel Public Assertion
of Fifth Amendment Rights

Congress should also not be permitted to compel witnesses to
publicly assert their right to remain silent because it does not further
the legislative process. Congress has broad authority to conduct
investigations pursuant to its legislative power.279 However, as the
Court explained in Watkins:
There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of
individuals without justification in terms of the functions of the
Congress . . . [n]or is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency.
These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of
government. No inquiry is an end in itself, it must be related to, and
in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress.280

Similarly, in McGrain v. Daugherty, the Court emphasized that “[a]
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information.”281
As former Senator J. William Fulbright explained, “a congressional
investigation is primarily a search for information which it believed is
needed in order to solve a governmental problem.”282 However, when
Congress compels an individual to appear before a congressional
committee to merely assert his or her right against self-incrimination,
it receives no information.283 The committee obtains nothing beyond
the witness’s declination to answer questions. This effort does not
further the legislative process, because the only information it
provides is inferential. Legislating based on inference is ineffective
policy-making that is frowned upon by members of Congress.284 For
example, during the first oversight hearing involving Lerner,
Chairman Issa stated that Lerner’s “assertion is not to be viewed or

278. Quinn, 349 U.S. at 164; see also Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197–
98 (1957) (stating that “[a]buses of the investigative process may imperceptibly lead
to abridgment of protected freedoms”).
279. See, e.g., Watkins, 354 U.S at 187.
280. Id.
281. 273 US. 135, 175 (1927).
282. J.W. Fulbright, Congressional Investigations: Significance for the Legislative
Process, 18 U. CHI. L. REV 440, 440 (1951).
283. See generally D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 31 (1977).
284. See 2013 Oversight Committee Hearing, supra note 1, at 24 (2013) (expressing
the general sense of the Oversight Committee that the witness’s silence would not be
used to draw conclusions about agency actions).
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used during this hearing to make any determination, plus or minus, as
to actions that were taken [by the IRS].”285 Other members of the
committee, particularly Ranking Member Cummings, expressed
strong support for Chairman Issa’s statement.286 This rare moment of
bipartisanship serves to reinforce the notion that a witness’s silence
does not further the legislative purpose.287
D. Alternatives to Gather Relevant Information When a
Witness Claims Fifth Amendment Rights During a Congressional
Hearing
Precluding compelled public assertions of the privilege against selfincrimination does not mean that Congress can do nothing if it
determines that the only way to obtain critical information is by
compelling an individual’s testimony. In such an instance, Congress
has already established a mechanism by which it can get this
information—granting immunity. As discussed in Part I, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6005, Congress may grant immunity to an
individual with “a majority of the House or Senate or by a two-thirds
vote of the full committee seeking the order.”288 Instead of forcing
witnesses to appear before Congress to assert their right to remain
silent, granting immunity would enable a congressional committee to
obtain information that would aid its investigation. As Congress has
already established the mechanism by which it grants immunity, it is
reasonable to believe that Congress will be able to easily immunize
witnesses who may possess relevant information but have expressed
an intent to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege.
Although granting immunity does present a challenge when the
Department of Justice (DOJ) is engaged in a simultaneous
investigation, this challenge is not insurmountable.289 Congress
should work with the DOJ to decide whether to grant an individual
immunity despite the detrimental effect the immunity may have on
any potential criminal prosecution. In fact, such coordination is
mandated in the immunity statute, as the Attorney General must be
notified at least ten days before the request for immunity order is
issued.290 Additionally, the Attorney General can request a twenty-

285. Id.
286. See id.
287. See id.
288. GARVEY & DOLAN, supra note 55, at 67 (paraphrasing 18 U.S.C. § 6005(a)
(2012)).
289. See ROSENBERG, supra note 60, at 13.
290. 18 U.S.C. § 6005(b) (2012).
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day delay in issuing the order.291 These requirements should facilitate
coordination between Congress and the DOJ and prevent scenarios
such as the Oliver North failed prosecution from occurring in the
future.
Even if Congress is unable to develop an effective working
relationship with the DOJ on the issue of immunity, it can still
balance these two interests.292 One commentator has suggested that
Congress should only grant immunity when “the demands of a
national crisis may justify sacrificing the criminal prosecution of those
involved . . . to uncover and publicize the truth.”293 In other instances
where there is less urgency, a more deliberate criminal prosecution
can be undertaken.294 This approach seems to offer an effective
solution that will ensure that Congress can obtain critical information
when appropriate without unnecessarily hampering law enforcement
efforts.
It is also important to note that while the holdings in the cases
prosecuting Lieutenant North295 and naval officer Poindexter296 during
the Iran-Contra scandal have made it more difficult for prosecutors to
secure the convictions of individuals who have received immunity,
Congress has nevertheless continued to grant immunity to
witnesses.297 In fact, as recently as 2008, the House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary (“Judiciary Committee”) granted
immunity for witnesses to testify in hearings regarding the forced
resignations of nine U.S. Attorneys.298 The Judiciary Committee
voted thirty-two to six in favor of granting immunity to former DOJ
staffer Monica Goodling after she informed the committee of her
intent to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege.299 Instead of
compelling Goodling to appear before Congress merely to assert her

291. Id. § 6005(c).
292. Lawrence E. Walsh, The Independent Counsel and the Separation of Powers,
25 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 9 (1988) (“The legislative branch has the power to decide
whether it is more important perhaps even to destroy a prosecution than to hold back
testimony they need. They make that decision. It is not a judicial decision or a legal
decision but a political decision of the highest importance.”).
293. ROSENBERG, supra note 60, at 13.
294. See id.
295. See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam),
modified, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
296. See United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
297. See ROSENBERG, supra note 60, at 13.
298. Id. at 14.
299. See Klaus Marre, House Judiciary Panel Grants Immunity to Goodling, HILL
(Apr. 25, 2007, 1:09 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/news/11696-house-judiciarypanel-grants-immunity-to-goodling.
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right against self-incrimination, the Judiciary Committee granted her
immunity and then issued a subpoena to compel her testimony and
the production of documents.300 Goodling subsequently testified
before the Judiciary Committee and offered information that assisted
the congressional investigation.301
In this way, the Judiciary
Committee was able to actually gather information for its
investigation without subjecting the witness to needless public
shaming.302
This approach—which avoids the inherent issues
associated with calling a witness to assert the Fifth Amendment and
ensures that Congress will obtain information—is a viable alternative
solution in instances where a witness will invoke the right to remain
silent.
Another way to balance individual constitutional rights with
Congress’s legislative power is to compel the witness to appear at a
closed executive session before the congressional committee.303 This
approach will ensure that the individual actually asserts his or her
right in front of Congress. On the other hand, granting immunity
remains a preferable approach because it enables Congress to obtain
information it seeks. Unlike an assertion of the right against selfincrimination, granting immunity compels the individual to answer
Congress’s questions and provides Congress with the information it
seeks to further its investigative and legislative goals. As the ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility explains, “[t]he primary
business of a legislative body is to enact laws rather than to adjudicate
controversies.”304 Accordingly, when the information a witness may
possess is sufficiently important, Congress should grant the person
immunity to obtain the information instead of calling the witness to a

300. See CQ Transcripts Wire, Goodling Testifies Before the House Judiciary
Committee, WASH. POST, May 23, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/transcripts/goodling_testimony_052307.html.
301. See generally id. Judiciary Committee Chairman John Conyers even
explained that granting immunity and compelling Goodling to appear before
Congress:
[A]re steps that I did not take likely [sic], but only after consultation with
the ranking member, Lamar Smith, and my colleagues on both sides of the
aisle with the Justice Department. I believe that this [subpoena] is an
important and necessary step to help us get to the bottom of the U.S.
attorney matter and other concerns regarding possible improperly
politicalization [sic] of the Justice Department.

Id.
302. See generally id.
303. See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 31 (1977).
304. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-16 (1980).
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closed session to test the individual’s resolve in asserting his or her
constitutional right.
CONCLUSION
Congressional investigations face legitimate challenges when
confronted with witnesses who may possess important information
but are unwilling to appear before a committee to testify because the
information will tend to incriminate them. In balancing these
competing interests, Congress should embrace the approach taken in
Standard 3-5.7(c), which explicitly counsels against calling a witness in
a criminal prosecution when the prosecutor knows the witness will
claim a valid privilege not to testify. This approach is consistent with
the true spirit of the ethical rules. It also properly places the
individual right against self-incrimination above Congress’s oversight
power and will ensure that Congress makes its legislative decisions
based on facts and not speculation driven by witness silence.

